Copy of Ph122 essay 2 q. 4, Final: Conception the Key to Perceptual Experience of the External World

I’ve shared Copy of Ph122 essay 2 q. 4, draft 3

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Sorry, this is the latest edition

Hannah M. Mecaskey

Philosophy 122-Theory of Knowledge

Prof. Barry Stroud

Essay 2, Question 4: Conception the Key to Perceptual Experience of the External World

27 October 2011

Q.4. Could you see that it looks to you as if there is a tomato on a plate before you if you did not understand what a tomato, or a plate, is? If so, how? Could you understand what a tomato, or a plate, is if there were no possible circumstances in which you could correctly recognize in your perceptual experience that a tomato, or a plate, is actually present?

The traditional philosophical problem of the external world as construed by Descartes suggests that individuals have the capacity to dream up, or cognitively entertain, a mind-based reality which in no way corresponds to, or even depends on, an external world. Referring to a problem of an “external” world, we are discussing whether or not one can be sure of a reality, of a world, which has existence apart from one’s mind. In this case, “external world” refers to a mind-independent sphere of sustained, objectual existence. Such a theory proposes that one would be able to understand what a tomato and a plate were without having perceptual experience of such items. This Cartesian theory presents a picture of the world in which at the very least, the perceptual capacities of the mind undergo experiences that do not necessarily demonstrate the existence of the external world. In this dualistic frame of mind, Descartes would likely claim that one had no way of verifying what a plate or tomato is apart from the mental concept. However, he does not seem to question human capability of entertaining such concepts as “plate” and “tomato” without actual experience of such thing in the external world.

Thus, one might infer from one’s perceptual experience that there is a tomato on a plate before me, but this Cartesian kind of conceptualization assumes merely a mental existence of concepts without their application in the world. While Stroud has admitted that there are no verifiable proofs against the Cartesian skepticism of solipsism, Stroud suggests that a way of answering this philosophical doubt in a way more like how humans actually experience the world, through a composite unit of mind/ body rather than as subjective minds ruling bodies. Stroud’s overturning of Cartesian doubt rides upon his definition as a concept which is some idea applied through perceptual experience to an object in the world. While Cartesian skepticism concerning the reach of perceptual experience may allow one to have thoughts of concrete things without those ideas being rooted in a world beyond the self, Stroud contests that such a notion of “conceptualization” defies the way human beings normatively apply concepts. Instead, Stroud attempts to debunk this restriction of knowledge to an activity of the mind devoid of sensory input because of the way in which the human mind seems to derive concepts from perceptual experience.

In order to prove that an individual would not even be able to conceive the thought “it looks to me as if there is a tomato on a plate” without the perceptual experience of tomatoes and plates, Stroud appeals to the conceptual capacities of the human mind.[1] Stroud notes that human beings seem to accept that “we an find by perception reasons to believe things about what the world is like.”[2] This indicates that human beings seem to accept the notion of concepts as “predicates of possible judgements,”[3] wherein “to possess and understand a concept is to have a capacity to employ that concept in the making of judgments.”[4] So it would seem from Stroud’s perspective, to speak of perceptual knowledge concerning tomatoes and plates, one would have to be able to apply a concept to a judgement about a thing in the world, stepping beyond the constraints of the Cartesian use of the notion of a concept.

What does Stroud’s definition of a “concept” bring to bear on Cartesian restriction of perceptual experience, concerning the application of concepts in situations where one could not possibly recognize the presence of a plate or tomato within ones visual experience? Stroud himself raises the question, in response to Cartesian skepticism concerning perceptual knowledge, whether one could have purely sensory knowledge without knowing anything about the external world.[5] Arguing that the capacity to think is contingent upon the possibility of applying concepts through a process of discrimination to objects in the external world, Stroud argues, a different understanding of perceptual knowledge than contained within Cartesian skepticism.[6] While the skeptical view permits that thoughts involving concepts and judgments about truth or falsities in the external world could be wrong, Stroud argues that this is not at all possible. According to Stroud, if one cannot perceive objects in a mind independent world and make judgements about them, one has no conceptual content for judgement, or skepticism at all. In order for one to be able to say “it looks to me as if there is a tomato on a plate,” Stroud would claim that one must be able to know objects through perceptual experience, in order to rightly apply concepts to such items in one’s experience.

Therefore from Stroud’s perspective, it is not possible for one to say that “it looks to me as if there is a tomato on a plate”, if one is not capable of conceiving of a tomato or a plate as determinate objects in the world met via perceptual experience. Stroud says to perceive “that such-and-such is so” or at least that it seems to one to be so, requires “‘propositional’ perception.”[7] Such propositional perception allows one to distinguish one thing from another, which involves a knowledge of things external to our minds in a world we take to be true, concerning objects in that world we also take to be true. For Stroud, “if a person’s purely perceptual knowledge did not extend to anything that is, or would be so independently of it’s being perceived,” such a limited capacity of perception would prevent such a person from discriminating between objects of their perception, since these concepts are not within the capacity of this person’s determinate perception.[8] Such a restriction limits the reach of perceptual knowledge.

If a person is not capable of saying that it looks to them as if there is a tomato on a plate, Stroud would say that such a person is not capable of propositional perception, but merely objectual (at best). Saying “it looks to me as if such-and-such is on so-and-so” is a judgment of propositional perception, rather than one of objectual perception, which is merely taking that something is so in the world.[9] Since objectual seeing does not require a belief about what one sees, but is merely the acceptance of an object given to one through visual perception as existing, seeing that it looks to as if there is a tomato on a plate requires propositional perception of the subject perceiving. Yet this kind of propositional perception is fundamentally based on objectual perception, since the latter for Stroud is fundamental for thought.[10] A belief that perceptual knowledge gives one a kind of experiential access to the external world is necessary in order to establish objectual perception at all, because objects encountered in objectual perception are the foundations of concepts by which one expresses thoughts and forms judgments.

Stroud argues further, that “if the concepts expressed by those predicates [predicates linguistically founded upon objects experienced via objectual perception] were needed for seeing the objects in the first place, there would be no way to get started.”[11] By this, Stroud indicates that if there were no possible circumstances in which one could correctly recognize actual presence of objects in ones own perceptual experience, such as a tomato or a plate, one would not be capable of having concepts of plate or tomato. Establishing perceptual knowledge as the precondition for having thoughts, Stroud’s overcoming approach to the problem of the external world draws its force from his analysis of conceptualization. The argument Stroud makes to overthrow the restricted view of perceptual knowledge as internal to the mind, which is founded upon the idea that concepts are developed through first encounter with objects in world via objectual perception, and then the forming if beliefs or ideas about these objectual perceptions, which allows one to have a concept and apply it to things in the world.

Thus according to the Cartesian skepticism concerning perceptual experience of the external world, in the context of a mind-body dualism where the mind is the location of the subject, one is only capable of understanding such mental concepts as “plate” or “tomato” apart from the perceptual experience of these things. In this restricted view of perception, one must know these concepts apart from objects in an external world, because perceptual experience is not sufficient to verify the existence of an external world. Since perceptual experience gives merely sense-data which must be mediated to the mind by inference, the possibility of doubting one’s perceptual experience is great. Thus, one could say “it looks to me as if there is a tomato on a plate” only insofar as the ideas of tomato and plate were purely mental, only capable of being inferred onto experience obtained through perception.

Stroud’s objection to this idea is chiefly that human beings understand conceptualization to be the process of applying an idea in the mind to an object in an external world. According to Stroud then, one could only see that “it looks to me as if there is a tomato on a plate” only if one were able to know what such things were through propositional perception, involving the application of the concepts to objects in a mind-independent world. Stroud’s reexamination of the skeptical use of concepts attempts to describe a more plausible, more realistic process of human understanding as involving the senses, which is a direct connection between perceptual experience and human knowledge, such that seeing objectually that a tomato is on a plate could lead one to conclude that a tomato is on a plate.

Ph122 essay 2- Overcoming the Problem of the External World

I’ve shared Ph122 essay 2 q. 4, draft 2

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• Ph122 essay 2 q. 4, draft 2

Ph122 essay 2 q. 4, draft 2

Mecaskey

Hannah M. Mecaskey

Philosophy 122-Theory of Knowledge

Prof. Barry Stroud

Essay 2, Question 4

27 October 2011

Q.4. Could you see that it looks to you as if there is a tomato on a plate before you if you did not understand what a tomato, or a plate, is? If so, how? Could you understand what a tomato, or a plate, is if there were no possible circumstances in which you could correctly recognize in your perceptual experience that a tomato, or a plate, is actually present?

Overcoming the Problem of Restricted Perception of the External World

The traditional philosophical problem of the external world as construed by Descartes suggests that individuals have the capacity to dream up, or cognitively entertain, a mind-based reality which in no way corresponds to, or even depends on, an external world. Such a theory proposes that one would be able to understand what a tomato and a plate were without having perceptual experience of such items. This Cartesian theory presents a picture of the world in which at the very least, the perceptual capacities of the mind undergo experiences that do not necessarily demonstrate the existence of the external world. In this dualistic frame of mind, Descartes would likely claim that one had no way of verifying what a plate or tomato is apart from the mental concept, but he does not seem to question human capability of entertaining such concepts as “plate” and “tomato” without actual experience of such thing in the external world.

Thus, one might infer from one’s perceptual experience that there were a tomato on a plate before one, but this Cartesian kind of conceptualization assumes merely a mental existence of concepts without their application in the world. While Stroud has admitted that there are no verifiable proofs against the Cartesian skepticism of solipsism, Stroud suggests that a way of answering this philosophical doubt in a way more like how humans actually experience the world, through a composite unit of mind/ body rather than as subjective minds ruling bodies. Stroud’s overturning of Cartesian doubt rides upon his definition as a concept which is some idea applied through perceptual experience to an object in the world. While Cartesian skepticism concerning the reach of perceptual experience may allow one to have thoughts of concrete things without those ideas being rooted in a world beyond the self, Stroud contests that such a notion of “conceptualization” defies the way human beings normatively apply concepts. Instead, Stroud attempts to debunk this restriction of knowledge to an activity of the mind devoid of sensory input because of the way in which the human mind seems to derive concepts from perceptual experience.

In order to prove that an individual would not even be able to conceive the thought “it looks to me as if there is a tomato on a plate” without the perceptual experience of tomatoes and plates, Stroud appeals to the conceptual capacities of the human mind.[1] Stroud notes that human beings seem to accept that “we an find by perception reasons to believe things about what the world is like.”[2] This indicates that human beings seem to accept the notion of concepts as “predicates of possible judgements,”[3] wherein “to possess and understand a concept is to have a capacity to employ that concept in the making of judgments.”[4] So it would seem from Stroud’s perspective, to speak of perceptual knowledge concerning tomatoes and plates, one would have to be able to apply a concept to a judgement about a thing in the world, stepping beyond the constraints of the Cartesian use of the notion of a concept.

What does Stroud’s definition of a “concept” bring to bear on Cartesian restriction of perceptual experience, concerning the application of concepts in situations where one could not possibly recognize the presence of a plate or tomato within ones visual experience? Stroud himself raises the question, in response to Cartesian skepticism concerning perceptual knowledge, whether one could have purely sensory knowledge without knowing anything about the external world.[5] Arguing that the capacity to hing involves the ability to apply concepts, through a process of discrimination, to objects in the external world, Stroud argues, a different understanding of perceptual knowledge than contained within Cartesian skepticism.[6] While the skeptical view permits that thoughts involving concepts and judgments about truth or falsities in the external world could be wrong, Stroud argues that this is not at all possible, for if one cannot perceive objects in a mind independent world and make judgements about them, one has no conceptual content for judgement, or skepticism at all. In order for one to be able to say “it looks to me as if there is a tomato on a plate,” Stroud would claim that one must be able to know objects through perceptual experience, in order to rightly apply concepts to such items in one’s experience.

Therefore from Stroud’s perspective, it is not possible for one to see that it looks to them as if there is a tomato on a plate, if they are not capable of conceiving of a tomato or a plate through applying judgments to objects in the world met in perceptual knowledge. Stroud says to perceive “that such-and-such is so” or at least that it seems to one to be so, requires “‘propositional’ perception.”[7] Such propositional perception allows one to discriminate one thing from another, which involves a knowledge of things external to our minds in a world we take to be true, concerning objects in that world we also take to be true. For Stroud, “if a person’s purely perceptual knowledge did not extend to anything that is, or would be so independently of it’s being perceived,” such a limited capacity of perception would prevent such a person from discriminating the object of their perception, since these concepts are not within the capacity of this person’s determinate perception.[8] Such a restriction limits the reach of perceptual knowledge.

If a person is not capable of saying that it looks to them as if there is a tomato on a plate, Stroud recognizes this as a judgement that their perception is so- a statement of propositional perception, rather than one of objectual perception, is taking that something is so in the world.[9] Since objectual seeing does not require a belief about what one sees, but is merely the acceptance of an object given to one through visual perception as existing, seeing that it looks to as if there is a tomato on a plate requires propositional perception of the subject perceiving. Yet this kind of propositional perception is fundamentally based on objectual perception, since the latter for Stroud is fundamental for thought.[10] A belief that perceptual knowledge gives one a kind of experiential access to the external world is necessary in order to establish objectual perception at all, because objects encountered in objectual perception are the foundations of concepts by which one expresses thoughts and forms judgments.

Stroud argues further, that “if the concepts expressed by those predicates [predicates linguistically founded upon objects experienced via objectual perception] were needed for seeing the objects in the first place, there would be no way to get started.”[11] By this, Stroud indicates that if there were no possible circumstance in which one could correctly recognize actual presence of objects in ones own perceptual experience, such as a tomato or a plate, one would not have the concepts of plate or tomato. This summarizes the argument Stroud makes to overthrow the restricted view of perceptual knowledge as merely of the internal, which is founded upon the idea that concepts are developed through first encounter with objects in world via objectual perception, and then the forming if beliefs or ideas about these objectual perceptions, which allows one to have a concept and apply it to things in the world.

Thus according to the Cartesian skepticism concerning perceptual experience of the external world, in the context of a mind-body dualism where the mind is the location of the subject, one is only capable of understanding such mental concepts as “plate” or “tomato” apart from the perceptual experience of these things. In this restricted view of perception, one must know these concepts apart from objects in an external world, because perceptual experience is not sufficient to verify the existence of an external world. Thus, one could say “it looks to me as if there is a tomato on a plate” only insofar as the ideas of tomato and plate were purely mental, only capable of being inferred onto experience obtained through perception. Stroud’s objection to this idea is chiefly that human beings understand conceptualization to be the process of applying an idea in the mind to an object in an external world. According to Stroud then, one could only see that “it looks to me as if there is a tomato on a plate” only if one were able to know what such things were through propositional perception, involving the application of the concepts to objects in a mind-independent world. Stroud’s reexamination of the skeptical use of concepts attempts to describe a more plausible, more realistic process of human understanding as involving the senses.

Study ruined my faith

Study ruined my faith

If I say this, am I a dolt?
Is it true faith is for the blind, for the naive, the innocent?
Can I even say such things, and is it merely symptomatic of a religious loss of innocence…or have I become corrupted by the culture? My faith has certainly lost wonder, but perhaps due to exhaustion. I have those moments of wonder.
But then I find myself caught, along with the rest of my generation, Questioning where wonder comes in,
In a scientific world. God was amazing when we were so dependent When we needed god in our own minds to send rain,
To rise us from our sleep, keep our lungs filled with breath. But I feel that we,with the scientific and theories to explain Almost anything that we have,
We are being given a greater challenge…
A greater obstacle to overcome,
And more of a responsibility, considering that we have a different kind of spiritual knowledge due to the technological And scientific advances accomplished in our lifetimes.
What will god mean to our children?
I have never stopped finding the bible to be a fountain of truth. But when I say that, I don’t mean what most assume
Who go to church and study the word or hear it proclaimed.
I see truth, in the layers upon layers of interpretation,
Within the text, external to the text…
For all we have besides grammar, and even in the grammar,
Is interpretation, readings.
With faith, we are drawn deeper and deeper into the text.
How does faith start, what is it?
I could quote heb. 11.1, I could give Martin buber’s definition.. But the question is too hard to define.
It requires a kind of death to gain life, says apostle paul. It takes a leap beyond reason, says Kierkegaard.
It is foolishness to gain wisdom.
What does the way of faith in a text give what is not given elsewhere? I have so many questions about faith now.
About where my messiah is, what happened to the end of days after his death… The eschaton? Really? The change happened internally, now,
And won’t happen externally except through us in the end?
I have untraditional beliefs where my experience has brought me Am I still a Christian? I still love Jesus.
Am I still a person of faith? Yes but….
But perhaps it is more than just losing,
Perhaps there is this other richness I have not let permeate me deeply enough. There is still grace, I just have to reconsider myself in relation to it. My questions are genuine or I wouldn’t ask at all.

Sent from my iPad

Addendum to “I told Jesus today”

I wished to simply clarify the Jesus scenario about which I was discussing in the previous posting: it describes Jesus coming over, spending time, packing up and leaving, and amongst a lot of things it could mean, it means the current conception of Jesus which I have has been walking away for some time, faced with what I have been pondering in seminary for the past several years. The exclusive Jesus who absorbed all my energy up, but Jesus as I experience Him now it is an opening experience. So how does one transition personally and professionally?

I told Jesus today

I told Jesus today

I sat down with Jesus just now.
We sat side by side, on a bed, where I was reading.
At first, we smiled in delight at one another’s presence.
Real joy, real delight that doesn’t need qualification.
That just is.
We started talking, He touched His knee to mine, and I, shy
Held my physical position.
He scooted closer, and though shy I was eager for Him,
I’d missed Him terribly. The ache in my heart,
The desire for affirmation in my yearning,
It was all brought close to me as Jesus sat down,
Desiring to be close to me, in an inexpressible way.
I was not so innocent of His desire, but at the same time,
As I saw the comfortable, natural way in which He expressed
And possessed His desire, I recognized my own discomfort.
I just wanted Him too, but I made it overly complicated.
I realized, sitting there next to Him, with Him, experiencing Him as He gave Himself to me,
This was the first person I had been with
Who had given me back to myself.
Who had validated my desires and handed them to me.
As He placed his arms around me and kissed me,
That kind of passionate abandon, I realized I would never be Done searching. Perhaps this running, running, always running, This searching, I feel as if I chase the wind.
But can I stop?
I left Him alone, just for a few minutes,
And came back into my own space, my own mourning,
My own searching, my own place of confusion,
Resisting definition. Resisting determination, clarity.
And when I came out, Jesus was collecting His things.
A sad look in His eyes. If you want Me, dearest, you aren’t quite ready You don’t know what you want,
You need to be with yourself longer, alone.
I froze at His words. Tears came, and left after He was gone. Then the torrent of words came again…
Everything I wanted to say, but He had gone,
To leave me alone,
To let me learn.
And I am terrified, but grateful.
And I accept.
But Jesus, I want to tell you one thing,
Just one more thing as I go to learn:
Thank you, you took me as me, and let me run into you
And there, you validated all that yearning
About which I was shy. You gave me back me,
You told me the desires of my heart were mine,
And should be. So I hung onto You,
Selfishly trying to draw You into me.
So you stepped back and said, it will best
When you are free, free to be
Just alone with Yourself.
Stop searching for now, and be.
Live and let the change happen, wash over you.
So thank you, Jesus, in the way you spoke to me,
Gently pushing me, to be alone with myself.

A Jesus movement towards Yom Kippur Teshuva

A Jesus movement towards Yom Kippur Teshuva

Today was rough on the religious field of being Catholic. I find myself to be a rather passionate person, ranging in all respects from emotions to interests… Some think a little too tossed about by it all, others appreciate the movement I have flowing through me. I completely understand the need for rational thinking, for taking a step back, for moving away from before approaching something that strikes one in the heart. Like the mass readings and homily I heard today, which tore at my heart and caught it in my throat, resurrecting a host of deeper issues with my very Christianity. Not Jesus, mind you, but Christianity…specifically Catholicism.

And before I proceed, I must confess I waffled through the readings and homily between giving the preacher, the lectionary organizer, and the church itself the benefit of the doubt… And being overwhelmed with the knowledge that what I was hearing was symptomatic of a larger issue of Christian supsessionism, Christian anti-Judaism…and even greater, the issue of Christian self-righteousness which has led to relational destruction rather than a living out of a love-centered gospel. Let me begin by describing my experience of the readings and sermon, and then describing how another sermon, one given by a Jewish scholar in the context of Talmud study brought me towards a more appropriate teshuva of humility.

What would you do, if you were passionately committed to detangling the Christian identity and belief structure-intact and orthodox to it’s christological core, from supersessionism and anti-judaism, and to make matters worse were already plied by sufficient Christian guilt over non-consideration of events such as the Shoah, the crusades, etc. in christian theology….what would do if you heard the readings read at every English speaking catholic mass in the world today?

The readings were: Isaiah 5.1-7, a responsorial psalm based on psalm 80, Philippians 4.6-9, and Matthew 21.33-43??? For the ease of the reader, I have copied the texts as the appeared to Catholics today: FIRST READING: Is 5:1-7

Let me now sing of my friend,
my friend’s song concerning his vineyard.
My friend had a vineyard
on a fertile hillside;
he spaded it, cleared it of stones,
and planted the choicest vines;
within it he built a watchtower,
and hewed out a wine press.
Then he looked for the crop of grapes,
but what it yielded was wild grapes.

Now, inhabitants of Jerusalem and people of Judah,
judge between me and my vineyard:
What more was there to do for my vineyard
that I had not done?
Why, when I looked for the crop of grapes,
did it bring forth wild grapes?
Now, I will let you know
what I mean to do with my vineyard:
take away its hedge, give it to grazing,
break through its wall, let it be trampled!
Yes, I will make it a ruin:
it shall not be pruned or hoed,
but overgrown with thorns and briers;
I will command the clouds
not to send rain upon it.
The vineyard of the LORD of hosts is the house of Israel,
and the people of Judah are his cherished plant;
he looked for judgment, but see, bloodshed!
for justice, but hark, the outcry!

RESPONSORIAL PSALM
Ps 80:9, 12, 13-14, 15-16, 19-2

R. :The vineyard of the Lord is the house of Israel.

A vine from Egypt you transplanted;
you drove away the nations and planted it.
It put forth its foliage to the Sea,
its shoots as far as the River.
R. The vineyard of the Lord is the house of Israel.
Why have you broken down its walls,
so that every passer-by plucks its fruit,
The boar from the forest lays it waste,
and the beasts of the field feed upon it?
R. The vineyard of the Lord is the house of Israel.
Once again, O LORD of hosts,
look down from heaven, and see;
take care of this vine,
and protect what your right hand has planted
the son of man whom you yourself made strong.
R. The vineyard of the Lord is the house of Israel.
Then we will no more withdraw from you;
give us new life, and we will call upon your name.
O LORD, God of hosts, restore us;
if your face shine upon us, then we shall be saved.
R. The vineyard of the Lord is the house of Israel.

SECOND READING: Phil 4:6-9
Brothers and sisters:
Have no anxiety at all, but in everything,
by prayer and petition, with thanksgiving,
make your requests known to God.
Then the peace of God that surpasses all understanding
will guard your hearts and minds in Christ Jesus.

Finally, brothers and sisters,
whatever is true, whatever is honorable,
whatever is just, whatever is pure,
whatever is lovely, whatever is gracious,
if there is any excellence
and if there is anything worthy of praise,
think about these things.
Keep on doing what you have learned and received
and heard and seen in me.
Then the God of peace will be with you.

GOSPEL ACCLAMATION: Mt 21:33-43
Jesus said to the chief priests and the elders of the people: “Hear another parable.
There was a landowner who planted a vineyard,
put a hedge around it, dug a wine press in it, and built a tower. Then he leased it to tenants and went on a journey.
When vintage time drew near,
he sent his servants to the tenants to obtain his produce.
But the tenants seized the servants and one they beat,
another they killed, and a third they stoned.
Again he sent other servants, more numerous than the first ones, but they treated them in the same way.
Finally, he sent his son to them, thinking,
‘They will respect my son.’
But when the tenants saw the son, they said to one another,
‘This is the heir.
Come, let us kill him and acquire his inheritance.’
They seized him, threw him out of the vineyard, and killed him. What will the owner of the vineyard do to those tenants when he comes?” They answered him,
“He will put those wretched men to a wretched death
and lease his vineyard to other tenants
who will give him the produce at the proper times.”
Jesus said to them, “Did you never read in the Scriptures:
The stone that the builders rejected
has become the cornerstone;
by the Lord has this been done,
and it is wonderful in our eyes?
Therefore, I say to you,
the kingdom of God will be taken away from you
and given to a people that will produce its fruit.”

By the end of the readings, ordered rhetorically by some lectionary organizer in hopefully some more archaic century than the current, the reader is assaulted with an overtly supersessionist (ie. Replacement theology which contains the implication that the Jewish covenant with God has ceased, and the Christian covenant with the God of Israel has replaced it… This is supersessionist at best, and anti-Jewish at worst) tone. From reading it aloud to my dear Jewish friend, hearing it myself with my fiancé, and from another catholic friend-all of whom felt the same superessionist tones- the readings seem at first hearing to associate Israel the vineyard with the killing of “the father’s” servants and son. For any reader of the Jesus scriptures, I.e. “the New Testament,” “father” even in a parabolic sense usually resonates with “God the Father” and “son” resonates with “Jesus, Son of God.” these two were the first implications my Jewish friend heard too in the gospel reading.

If the father in matthew’s parable is God and the Son Jesus, who are the other servants who get killed? Following typical christian thinking the prophets of course. All this could be read, so far, without implication of anti-Judaism or supersessionism. The next question is more crucial: who are the tenets in Matthews parable? That question is not so simple, and requires a close read to distinguish from Isaiah, which is so similar.

Reading Isaiah, I see the phrase “The vineyard of the LORD of hosts is the house of Israel” which is raised in the responsorial psalm, obviously an important point for the lectioner. Can I then assume the lectioner wants me to read Matthews vineyard as the house of Israel as well? Perhaps. So who does that make the tenets? Also of the house of Israel? I look at isaiah in it’s context and find a critique of Israel. A critique for reasons most preachers likely did not consider in writing their sermon, nor do I need to in order to dismantle anti-judaic readings or supersessionist readings. It is enough to say jesus’ words also look like a critique. But of Israel? Really? As the preacher I heard took it… To a critique of the Jews who killed the prophets and ultimately the son of God. Oooooo my. So then, seeing as how Isaiah can be read entirely through the gospel due to the texts similarity, I take a step back and analyze the texts.

Isaiah is critiquing the vineyard itself, as one who is also a part of the vineyard, pulled out a bit to gain perspective of the vineyard. Jesus, however, is talking to those who tend the vineyard. Not the vineyard itself. From Jesus’ words, we get the gist that the vineyard is thriving and producing much fruit if it’s owner is willing to go to all this trouble to try and get his deserts of it. So Let’s examine a possible solution to the identity of the people whom Jesus is critiquing. I see a clue in the first line of the gospel reading “Jesus said to the chief priests and the elders of the people.”

Applying a socio-political critical lens to a reading of the gospel, Jesus may be critiquing the actions of the leaders of Israel, both politically and religiously… In fact, that seems to be the very people to whom he is talking. But, one might say, are these people ot Jewish too? Or as others have argued, representative of the Jewish people in virtue if being communal leaders? I think the last point is somewhat ridiculous in the second temple context, noting that there were many divergent Judaic movements pulling away from the temple cult in Jerusalem, one of which the historical Jesus may have been a part or at very least familiar with, the Pharisees. Could Jesus in this gospel be saying these leaders, in being corrupted by selfish desire for power and glory, have pitted war with god for God’s very people, who are thriving… But may not for long if, as the kings of Israel, they are led astray by corrupt leaders. I see ample possibility for developing a theme of political critique and the importance of humility before god, in the case of the people of Israel in the warning of Isaiah, in Paul’s little section in relationships as brothers and sisters, and in the gospel, as religious and political leaders.

In so saying, that this need not be a superessionist or anti-jewish gospel reading, which would be contrary to the very message I think Jesus is conveying here… These readings may be containing the notion of teshuva, of repentance, which is appropriate to cultivate as we approach the Jewish holiday of Yom kippur, the day of atonement. My repentance is that I heard this and flew off the handle… Admittedly in a church that is so historically anti-Jewish, and continues to discredit the damage of supersessionism not only to the Jews as a people and Jewish-Christian relations, but also to the loving, unifying gospel of Jesus. I should assume more the best in intentions… While still struggling to erode the massive dam of supersessionism that still holds the relational unity of Jews and Christians at bay.

It breaks my heart. Leslie and Brett can attest to that.
Mercy, mercy, we are all in need of more loving mercy from ourselves, our own judging spirits, and in need of something new.

In love,
Hannah Mecaskey

GTU MA theology/MA Philosophy, Jewish-Christian studies and women’s studies in religion Sent from my iPad

Response to Chptr. 6 Clooney’s “Comparative Theology: Deep Learning Across Religious Borders”

My response to chapter 6, “Learning to See” of Comparative Theology is mostly confused questioning of the tenets of comparative theology, as well as what one is expected to do with the vision one obtains from learning to really look at other faith traditions. Without trying to judge, merely offering some observations, the chapter from pg. 87 to 102 seemed like a beautiful meditation on the place of the feminine in the ultimate divinity, to use phraseology that is as open as possible. The progression of this chapter leads from a fully female goddess slowly to returning to a very male Christ, who seems all the more complimented for the presence of these women.

Clooney begins contemplating the wonder of Laksmi, a compassionate goddess, with language that speaks of curiosity, even possibly a desire to worship this goddess (pg. 88) but constrained by the creed of Christianity. Parting from this maternal figure with a curiosity concerning the exultation of female goddess over male by predominantly male devotees in Hindu culture, Clooney engages texts concerning the goddess Devi. Noting that through the poetic language of these hymns, which Clooney calls “acts of living speech, generative of worship” (91), the worshipper actually encounters a goddess, Clooney turns to examine his own Catholic experience of Marian theology.

Mindful of the intimacy if the goddess’ encounter with her worshippers through living hymns, Clooney re-examines Marian hymns to revitalize “antiquarian, mistaken, or downright harmful” (94) conceptions of Mary. I was particularly struck by Clooney’s consideration of Stabat Mater in which Mary stands, compassionate despite the violent death of her son, both her own flesh and her God. Alongside his considerations of the Hindu goddesses, this image of Mary causes masculine imagery to give way to female embodiment “as the source of life and hope.” (95)

Weaving into his construction the Islamic consideration of Mary and Jesus as both ultimately submissive to God and devoid of actual divinity, Clooney crafts a collage-like framework for his ultimate concern as a Catholic, Jesus and Christology. Adding the Christ-likeness of Sojourner Truth’s vision of God, Clooney progressively moves his theological construction from images of female divinities, to a female model of faith, to female mediating faith in powerful rhetoric across race, class, and gender barriers. At this point, Clooney loses me, because he takes this vast range of reflections, and joins them together in a few closing pages about seeing Christ in these reflections and these reflections leading one deeper on the path of faith in Christ.

Up until the closing, I saw Clooney constructing a collage of selectively related images that informed an example of comparative theology, but what the theological work of this vision is meant to do for the believer, it seems, is to root them in Christ in such a way as to span all barriers. Using the theme from Sojourner Truth’s vision of Gal. 3.28, Clooney seems to be preaching a sermon through a diverse and not very cohesive map of examples. Forgive me if this is too coldly logical, but how do these examples relate enough to lead us back to Christ, as Clooney desires (pg. 107)? I may simply need further explanation on how this sort of theological vision works, both seeing a thing as it is in the beauty of its own context, as well as how it intuitively relates to my own system of belief.

Humanity and intimacy

Intimacy.. I guess understanding that is the first step in understanding what Jesus and intimacy are together.

Towards a theology or a relationality of intimacy

To begin with, what is intimacy? Why does it require a theology? Intimacy is a state, I think, that probably requires a lot of distinctions in terms of how people interact. That is something that remained on my mind from the previous posting. It’s all confusing at times.

What is intimacy? Maybe that’s what this post should really question. It needs a theology because theological positions often dispose people towards or against human intimacy. Most theology in general warns against it, right? Or at least Christian theology warns against human intimacy because of…. Let’s hear the chorus… The FALL!

Should we be reluctant to engage so closely because of the danger of it all? Maybe my expectations are too high.

Intimacy is not sex. That may be part of some kind of intimate relationship, but it does not define intimacy.
Intimacy has something to do with what Brett is talking about, in conversation with my thoughts:

“The way I see it, intimacy requires reading the other person, understanding them and reacting to their way of relating to the world. And I don’t think the ability to do that is a distinctively male or female skill. I think maybe females become more invested in interpersonal relationships more often, and that maybe because of that there is a greater potential for intimacy, but the two are merely related. I don’t know. One of the more difficult things, for me, is trying to penetrate defenses enough to truly understand another person. To be vulnerable enough myself to trust, and to be worthy of trust. To know when even treading lightly isn’t treading lightly enough upon the sensitive areas of another’s psyche and spirit. Fighting the inherent and very strong tendency to generalize based on glimpses, to assume and fill in gaps in knowledge of the other, to draw conclusions from incomplete access – and instead to keep probing delicately. To keep open and to look with soft eyes. To care. That’s not always such an easy thing. Maybe it is different for men and women. Maybe men are colder, more objective and cut off. But what I have in mind is not simply an awareness of others – to me, care, genuine care, means always working to be attentive to the, often shifting and uncertain, feelings, emotions, desires, fears, and needs of another. It’s helping them find all of those things and foster some element of control over them. It’s more than just a doing, it’s a being-with. And I truly don’t think one can do that selflessly. Robots are self-less. People need people.”

I think his thoughts are beautiful and lay good ground for asking the question again. He approaches the closest thing he has to true intimacy, human relationships. I approach Jesus, with the model of such, and there is gets confusing, because he has no body. Jesus is not the same to relate with, yet my palette of words is limited. More sometime.

On relationality, a soul laid bare from “a soul called Hannah”

From another blog, A Soul Called Hannah:

Long airplane rides afford much thought… And sleepless ones give way to much irrational contemplation, for the good and ill. When one talks with god, it may not always be rational, and as god hears the whispers of the soul through that incomprehensible, inn utterable language of the spirit, it is only of concern to those whose spirits are not as well versed in the rigors of language that one should worry about translating the music or grating cries of the soul into linguistics. We attempt such things for the sake of various relationships, varying intimacies on different scales and levels. It changes depending on what wave lengths these intimacies are conducted within.

If I have a spiritual intimacy with someone, few words are needed. We know one another,despite time, distance apart, etc. We change and our spirits, due to their closeness, sense and comprehend the change. It’s a beautiful and rare thing.

I think of the relating which occurs between men and women and it occurs to me why in some cases, things happen as they do. I will particularize it to myself. The internal way intimacy functions for me makes little sense when the soul is not opened to another or receivable by another. It’s easy enough to close ourselves off, it’s the regular way we function in the world.

For the person, moi, of this kind of internal life, of unspoken intimate connections, the distance grows by leaps and bounds when the connection is untended, lost… Or never initially formed. I fancied as I wrote, considering the various sorts of interactions, that the men I tend to come in contact with… Whether it be by virtue of their masculinity or merely my perception, approach as close as could be imagined without opening, really.

Can there be an intimacy without the spiritual link? I wonder. In some fashion, yes. But largely, I say no. We live in the midst of non-intimate connections daily and are lost amongst them. We live lost. And maybe we don’t feel it. I named that lost yearning years ago and my life had created a kind of love affair of the whole ordeal. The existential fact of “lostness” coupled with an internal realization and attempt to cop, either by wedding oneself to Jesus, to the exclusion of the world, or in some type of exasperation, really insulating the deepest parts of ones vulnerability to allow closeness without intimacy.

Such is What I wonder, such is what I will never known until, by a persons own volition, I am told. My impression of female interaction, perhaps merely my own, and why women are stereotypically called emotional, is because of the connectedness… Even the connectedness brought and realized in what we call intimacy. Or what I call intimacy. And that connectedness is like a raw nerve running through me, each thing touches each next thing, so I become a part of whatever I involve myself in and have difficulty drawing back. I think those who know me might agree.

But maybe this is a difference of individuals or gender, but the men I know seem to experience intimacy in spurts or isolated experiences. Men can go in and come back out. It’s called objectivity, I guess (forgive all gross gender generalizations). Objectivity, to me, often equals coldness. It’s almost a different moral code from that of connectedness at time. So here we have my sense of connectedness relating to male sense of aloofness or disconnectedness… Or separateness. I know somewhere beneath all these languages of relation and expression, we each have deep internal lives. And yet I still do not speak the male language.

I have finally embraced the connectedness of my femininity, the relatedness, and work to unify the varying connections in my life. They are too complex to “fix” and too related to separate all too objectively. I do believe in logic and reason, as guides for the nature of humankind to decipher the good and the connections. But while I see the light of reason, there is also this language of my soul, this voice, whispering always like a hurricane, controlled. Usually.

I love where Neko case sings about the possibilities of this whirlwind: “my love, I am the speed of sound. I left them motherless, fatherless, their souls hanging inside out from their mouths… But it’s never enough.” that’s the yearning that attempts to connect again and again, leaving one for the next until a trail of strewn hearts and bodies lies in ones wake. It literally coaxes out the soul, and if it becomes too frustrated and furied in the quest for intimacy, has the capacity to leave the person as good as soul-less… The soul forever exposed. Maybe that’s why women were once called seductresses and sucubbuses. We who are as I describe, connect so dangerously.

Heaven would be on earth if the connects were truly open and intimate, because god would always be present, invited as well. Back to building a heaven on earth.

Poem after retreating

I wrote part of this poem 6 days ago before I went on retreat for the weekend, and the rest of it is the product of that retreat. Can you find the divide? More to come…

Perfection, complexion, the messy, greasy stuff covering my face;
A mask of cosmetics, disguising who I am, to be seen as a beauty
To be lauded as what I cannot hold together… I am hardly as put
Together as I seem, running hither and thither, always on my feet
A craving for business which will not let me unwind, is it the way I am
Cranked or is it merely a sign that I’ve gotten lost again, as this oh too
Passionate heart is wont to do, pursuing the ideas within relationships,
Someone known as truth and truth’s discovery in relating, what it means
With whom and why, creating sacredness from chastity, a term so misused

God might cry, if god had eyes or tears or feelings, but perhaps god does;
Who is brave enough to sacrifice for authenticity’s sake….
Perhaps it shouldn’t be a sacrifice, perhaps that’s the wrong call to make,
But each day I open my eyes to a brave new world under the same old sky
I cant help but consider the mascara circles under my eyes, the clumping
Eyesshadow that sparkled and shone in the blaring lights and pulsing
Noise and driving beat of the club my crazed heart raided, pillaging

A soul that used to be far more directed, far more wild in some sense…
Far more devoted and far more unsure in the most confidant way possible
My friend asked me over the weekend how I fell off the map.
Well, that’s just it… I didn’t know i really had… Jus felt a divide,
Stretching and growing and pushing me apart from my community
Growing feelings of aloneness and despondency should have told me,
Something was wrOng, o so wrong, and attending church doesn’t mend
Such things. At least i haven’t learned that worldview of communion.

So a “liberal Protestant” act I according to my Dominican brothers…
Caught up in the questions, the Martha-like syndrome of do…do…do…
Versus the be…be…be… That overwhelms the other half of Christendom…
Protestants act because they have faith without rest, Catholics and Orthodox
Just the opposite…. So much liturgy doing no one thinks about the activity of faith…
Where is our balance, dichotomized as we are… Is it this Dominican way?
Quasi-monastic, praying but preaching… Living in the space between the
Cloister and the mundane? I wonder, do all these questions and queries come
From a quest for vocation, is this the voice of my soul?